July 12, 1916.

NOTES ON THE MEXICAN CRISIS.

1. It is imperative that the State Department keep the War and Navy Departments informed of the political situation, and that no action leading to occupation take place until these two Departments are ready.

2. Occupation of the oil fields and coast cities would take place within 24 hours after the decision has been published that intervention will take place. As there are American citizens in practically all the ports on the East and West Coasts, the protection of these nationals is a problem.

They cannot be left at the mercy of the Mexicans while occupation is taking place in that area.

On the other hand, it is a question whether they will be permitted by the Mexicans to withdraw to a . . . vessel shoring up off the port.

The best solution seems to be to occupy the ports, and to plan the expedition accordingly.

3. Suggested mission of the Navy and Marine Corps:

(a) Occupation of such areas and ports as decided upon by Joint Board.

(b) Co-operate with Army in occupation of ports. (Navy).

(c) Patrol the coast. (Navy).
(d) Provide water transportation (sea and inland). (Navy).

4. The following ports, with tentative estimate of vessels and men required, should be occupied:

(1) EAST COAST

(a) Tampico – Tuxpan oil field.

6000 men
3 transports (able to enter Panuco River).
3 cruisers or gunboats (Destroyer type).
5 destroyers.
5 sub-chasers (for river and Lake Tampico work).

(b) Vera Cruz.

1000 men.
1 transport.
1 large cruiser.
1 destroyer.

(c) Puerto Mexico.

1000 men.
1 transport.
1 cruiser (D.N.V.A. type)
2 destroyers.

(d) Carmen, Frontera.

1000 men
1 transport
2 gunboats (not over 10' craft)
2 sub-chasers.

(e) Progreso

1000 men
1 transport
1 gunboat
2 tugs and barges
2 destroyers

(2) WEST COAST

(a) Following ports: Guaymas
Topolobampo
Nacatlán
Manzanillo
Acapulco
Salina Cruz
For which it is considered that:

6000 men
6 transports
6 cruisers or pre-dreadnoughts (might serve also as transports)
18 destroyers

will be necessary.

These estimates for both the east and west coasts are tentative and may be considerably modified by the detailed studies and plans and latest estimates as to the opposition likely to be encountered. The estimates are only for the occupation of these cities.

5. In case the Marine Corps is unable to supply the number of men necessary to occupy the ports mentioned on the east and west coasts, it is recommended that the Tuxpan-Tampico region be handled by the Marine Corps, and the other ports be occupied by the Army. In some respects this is more desirable as the ports will simply be bases for land operations, and the Army must take them over eventually.

6. The following points are important:

(a) The rainy season does not let up until the end of September. During this season the current in both Panuco and Coatzacoalcos Rivers is difficult. It is also the malaria season.

(b) Crossing the bar at Tuxpan is always dangerous in anything but specially constructed surf craft.

(c) The norther season will begin about October.

(d) The entrance to Carmen is shallow.

(e) The landing at Progresso would have to be in good weather with barges and small boats.

(f) Latest report indicates that 28' can be taken into the Panuco River. It usually shoals somewhat during the rainy season.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT BOARD (through the Chief of Naval Operations):

Subject: Mission of the Navy in connection with the approved Mexican War Plan.

1. In connection with the Mexican War Plan, dated July 14, 1919, approved by the Secretary of War July 21, 1919, the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee recommends that the following statement be approved by the Joint Board as the mission of the Navy in the event of intervention in Mexico:

(a) To blockade both coasts of Mexico.
(b) To seize and hold the Tampico oil fields for two weeks. This area to include the oil field region from Tuxpan to Tampico.
(c) To seize and hold the city of Vera Cruz for two weeks.
(d) To remove United States citizens from ports on both coasts. This may require the occupation of such ports.
(e) To render necessary assistance to the Army in the execution of its mission.

2. It is understood that the Army will relieve the Naval and Marine landing forces at the Tampico oil fields and at Vera Cruz within two weeks.

For the Joint Planning Committee:

W. I. Westervelt
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.

H. E. Yarnell
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Duplicate of this memorandum sent to the Chief of Staff of the Army.
SUBJECT: Forces necessary for the seizure and occupation for period of two weeks of Mexican oil region and the port of Vera Cruz.

1. It is considered that the forces given in tabular form below will be sufficient in strength for the purposes of seizing, occupying for a period of two weeks, and protecting property in, the Tampico and Tuxpan oil fields and the city and port of Vera Cruz. In arriving at this conclusion, consideration has been given to the several plans which have been recommended for the occupation of the oil region and to the limited reports on file in the vicinity.

2. No attempt is made now to give a plan in detail for the operations as it is believed that this should not be done without more detailed information than is now on hand and that considerable latitude must be allowed the officers commanding the forces. However, the number of men and the organizations suggested are such as to insure the occupation of the territories in question by the best and most practicable routes of approach, and in the shortest possible time; and also to ensure sufficient protection in all localities in which a great amount of damage to property might be attempted.

3. The total force is divided into two brigades of slightly different composition but each including 3 regiments of marines.

To the first brigade is assigned (a) the occupation of the city of Tampico and the adjacent oil terminals, water supply, etc., (b) the occupation and protection of the oil fields around Sanuco, Topila and Abano; and (c) the occupation of Vera Cruz. It is probable that about one regiment would be assigned to each of these tasks as indicated.

The second brigade, somewhat smaller than the first, is to be used in the occupation of necessary localities and the protection of property in the following areas - (a) from San Geromino to Cerro Azul and Tierra Amarilla; (b) from La Vena to Motrero; and (c) from Tamiahua to Alamo.
1st Brigade
Tampico and western fields
Vera Cruz

Tampico City, terminals, water supply, etc.
1 Regiment
125

Topila - Panuco
(with possibly detachment to Mabano and vicinity)
1 Regiment
125

Vera Cruz detachment
1 Regiment
125
1 M.G. Co. (from Brigade M.G. En.)
125

For general duty

Brigade headquarters
" signal co.
110
125

Brigade reserve.
1 Infy. Bn (from 2nd Brigade)
250
Brigade M.G. Bn. (less 1 Co.)
150
1 Battery 3" guns (4 guns)
150

Total enlisted 1st Brigade 4660

2nd Brigade
Southern fields

San Geronimo to Cerro Azul
1 Regiment
125
1 M.G. Co. (from Brigade Bn)
125

Tamiahua to Zorotero
1 Regt. less 1 Bn.
1000

Tuxpan to Alamo
1 Regt. less 1 Bn.
1000

For general duties

Brigade headquarters
" signal co.
110
125

Brigade reserve
1 Infantry Bn.
250
Brigade M.G. Bn. less 1 Co.
150
1 Battery 3" guns (4 guns)
150

Total enlisted 4160

4. All the organizations above named should conform to the Tables of Organization and Equipment, U.S. Marine Corps, 1919.

[Signature]