I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. Historical precedents as to the use of the armed forces of the United States for purposes of intervention, indicate that plans should be made to meet like emergencies which may occur in the future.

2. Possible emergencies are likely to be of the following types:

(a) Intervention to protect the lives and property of American citizens, e.g., intervention in China during the Boxer Uprising and at Nicaragua in 1912;

(b) Intervention to maintain the rights, dignity, and authority of the United States, e.g., occupation of Vera Cruz in 1914;

(c) Intervention to remedy conditions so injurious to the United States, as a neighboring nation, that they can no longer be endured, e.g., intervention in Cuba in 1898;

(d) Intervention to forestall action by other countries including the League of Nations, as a matter of international equity and as an implied obligation of the United States in view of its assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, e.g., action in Haiti and San Domingo.

3. While it is impossible to forecast the exact situation to be met in case of possible future interventions, it is reasonably certain that in the future, as in the past, the following conditions will characterize the general situation:

(a) The decision to intervene will be made suddenly, and probably as the result of some overt act or special situation which will largely, if not entirely, determine the character of the intervention and the means to be employed;

(b) The situation will be such that promptness of action will be of paramount importance;

(c) There will be no considerable hostile naval strength;

(d) Possible theaters of operations are Mexico, Central America, South America, and the West Indies.
II. DECISION AS TO GENERAL PLAN.

Major Decision.

4. To provide for such intervention operations as may be ordered by the President of the United States.

Minor Decisions.

(a) To provide for the employment of Naval and Marine Corps forces for all initial and subsequent overseas intervention operations, within the limit of their capacity to execute.

(b) To provide also for the employment of Army forces in all intervention operations for which Naval and Marine Corps forces are inadequate.

(c) That, when Joint Army and Navy action is ordered by the President, the Joint Board will formulate specific instructions, based upon said order and the situation existing at the time of the intervention; these instructions to include a statement of the Naval, Marine Corps, and Army forces required, the mission of such forces, and the theater of operations.

(d) In order to insure the immediate availability of Army forces suitable and adequate, for the operations contemplated by (b) and (c) above, to make provision for holding in a constant state of readiness such Army forces as will permit the prompt dispatch, of any one of the expeditionary forces below indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of Force</th>
<th>Approximate Strength</th>
<th>To sail from</th>
<th>Date of Sailing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variation A</td>
<td>1 division</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>Atlantic Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation B</td>
<td>1 corps (2 divs.)</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>Atlantic Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation C</td>
<td>1 division</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>Pacific Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation D</td>
<td>1 corps (2 divs.)</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>Pacific Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation E</td>
<td>1 division</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>Atlantic Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 division</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation F</td>
<td>1 division</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>Atlantic Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 corps (2 divs.)</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>Pacific Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation G</td>
<td>1 division</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>Pacific Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 corps (2 divs.)</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>Atlantic Ports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(e) To provide naval convoy and support during overseas movements and landing operations, for such Army Expeditionary forces as are dispatched.

III. MISSION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

5. (a) To make effective such intervention as may be ordered by the President of the United States.

Conitraitory Missions.

(b) To maintain the United States Army Forces in such a constant state of readiness as to permit the prompt dispatch of any one of the expeditionary forces set forth in paragraph 4 (d) above, and upon the selection of the force to be used, to embark and transport this force to the Theater of Operations, and thereafter to maintain the said force in the Theater of Operations.

(c) To establish, operate, and maintain all ports of embarkation for the Army Transport Service.

(d) To procure, man, and operate all vessels necessary for the transportation and maintenance of the Army Expeditionary Force; the convoy of such vessels to be conducted by the Navy in accordance with Articles 1461-1467 (inclusive), U. S. Navy Regulations and General Orders No. 18, War Department, 1911.

IV. MISSION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

6. (a) To make effective such intervention as may be ordered by the President of the United States.

Conitraitory Missions.

(b) To maintain in a constant state of readiness for prompt dispatch such Naval and Marine Corps Forces as may be necessary, for all initial and subsequent overseas intervention operations, within the limit of their capacity to execute, and to provide such Naval and Marine Corps Forces as may be required under paragraph 4 (c) above.

(c) To provide suitable Naval escort and support of Army Expeditionary Forces during overseas movements and landing operations, under any of the variations indicated in paragraph 4 (d) above; convoys to be conducted in accordance with Articles 1461-1467 (inclusive), U. S. Navy Regulations and General Orders No. 18, War Department, 1911.

(d) To provide hospital ship service for Army Expeditionary Forces.

(e) To cooperate fully with the Army in the execution of such missions as may be assigned to the Army, under any particular variation as set forth in paragraph 4 above.
V. ARMY AND NAVY PLANS.

7. The foregoing Joint Army and Navy Special Plan Violet, when approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, shall constitute the basis upon which the Army Special Plan Violet and the Navy Basic Violet Plan will be formulated and developed.

8. When any question of jurisdiction and responsibility arises that requires interpretation of this Basic Plan, the matter will be referred to The Joint Board for decision.